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On 18 September 2014, the Scottish electorate was asked whether Scotland should be-
come an independent country. Although independence was turned down, the debate has 
opened up various questions, many of economic nature. This thesis discusses the econom-
ics of constitutional change with reference to the case of Scottish independence. It con-
tributes to the academic debate by identifying the factors most critical to the success of an 
independent Scottish state. At first, the framework of constitutional change and plausible 
constitutional options for Scotland are outlined. Then, macro- and microeconomic topics 
relevant to independence are analysed. Detailed attention is paid to the question of cur-
rency choice and monetary policy. Other predominant issues under discussion are fiscal 
policy, state finances and the general impact greater autonomy might have on economic 
growth. Moreover, a brief case study of the oil and gas industry is utilised as an example 
of Scotland’s key industries and their impact on the economics of independence. Building 
on this in-depth literature analysis, the Critical Success Factor model is applied to the sce-
nario of Scotland becoming independent from the United Kingdom. The study results in 
identifying currency and monetary policy, the oil and gas industry, population, and exploi-
tation of opportunities opened up by independence as the most critical success factors, if 
success is measured as economic performance relative to the rest of the United Kingdom.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Scotland has a long and rich history both as an independent country and, for over 300 
years now, as part of the United Kingdom (UK). It belongs to what was once one of 
the greatest empires and still is among the political and economic leaders of the world. 
Scotland itself has been multiple times the centre of the world’s attention and nest for 
some of the most outstanding inventions and brightest people. Autumn 2014 marked 
yet again another crossroad of the Scottish journey when the first referendum in mod-
ern times on total Scottish independence was held on 18 September. Although the 
electorate eventually decided that Scotland stays in the union, the independence de-
bate has opened up various questions and sparked interesting discussions. 
 
Primarily, any question of independence is, by nature, political; who should hold the 
power and would act in the best interest of a given region? In the Scottish case, the 
economic aspects of the decision played a pivotal role. The uncertainty and risk of in-
dependence for the Scottish economy was in fact one of the main reasons for the No-
vote (Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2014: 17). Both political campaigns, Yes Scotland (pro inde-
pendence) and Better Together (pro union), stressed the economic vision of their re-
spective agenda and were joined by a great number of, presumingly more neutral, 
(academic) commentators.  
 
While it is generally acknowledged that Scotland could be a successful independent 
country there is controversy about how to best achieve and secure this. One of the 
main arguments is about the currency of a Scottish state. The pro independence cam-
paign made the case that it would be in the best interest for both Scotland and the rest 
of the United Kingdom (RUK) to form a currency union. This was, however, turned 
down by Westminster1 politicians. The other currency options for an independent Scot-
land generally are creating its own currency, trying to join the Eurozone or keeping the 
pound without the approval of the RUK. Each of the options has its advocates and set 
of consequences. 
 
                                                
1 ”Westminster“ refers to the area of London where the British parliament is located and com-
monly used as a synonym fort he UK parliament and government. 
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The outcome of the referendum has put an abrupt end to the dreams of Scottish inde-
pendence for the nearby future. Sadly, this is also true for much of the discussion 
about the economics of constitutional change regarding the Scottish case; many ques-
tions and concerns were left unanswered. This thesis attempts to revisit the most im-
portant issues and will this way help an informed debate in the future. Furthermore, 
the independence topic was dominated by mass media looking at some chosen as-
pects. Preliminary research for this thesis has found that the debate has left loose ends 
behind and lacked an overall, comprehensive approach to the economics of Scottish 
independence. Andrew Goudie (2013) has identified the same problem. In the book 
“Scotland’s Future: The Economics of Constitutional Change” he has gathered and ed-
ited contributions of renowned experts on various topics regarding Scotland’s inde-
pendence.  
 
This thesis follows this path and tries to address the question of which economic fac-
tors are the most relevant for the Scottish independence case. Firstly, the economic 
framework underlying constitutional change is discussed and aspects of it, such as the 
interrelation between different economic themes, are analysed. This way the generally 
important topics for constitutional change are identified. These are discussed in detail 
and analysed with reference to Scotland in the subsequent chapters. The final part  
builds on this foundation and applies the Critical Success Factor tool to this scenario in 
order to identify the elements that should be prioritised and addressed properly to en-
sure long-term success of independent Scotland. Before that the methodology used for 
the research is explained. Also a chapter outlining the context of Scotland’s independ-
ence movement is included. 
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2 Methodology 
 
The currency of the events underlying the research idea lead to the privilege of having 
a large quantity of up-to-date literature available. The thesis takes advantage of this 
situation and is founded mainly on secondary sources coming from a range of contribu-
tors, including academic journals, informed commentary, government reports, publica-
tions from various research institutions and centres, newspapers, periodicals and text-
books. At a later stage, quantitative data is used where applicable.  
 
This approach ensures that the analytical framework is built upon a thorough under-
standing of the theories and policies relevant to the economics of constitutional 
change. Specific characteristics of the Scottish economy are then discussed on this 
basis. The link is made with regards to various economic topics, for example macroe-
conomic aspects and general growth prospects.  While the whole thesis is written as 
one comprehensive analysis, later chapters are devoted to the application of specific 
tools, for example the Critical Success Factor Analysis. This contributes to the devel-
opment of a specific verdict.   
 
By nature the research carried out has certain limitations; the analysis is based on and 
features some assumptions. These are, however, widely accepted and made to the 
best knowledge of the author. Moreover, the choice of taking a universal approach to 
the topic means that certain themes of Scottish independence are only covered briefly. 
This does, however, not contradict the aim of the thesis: to identify and analyse the 
most essential factors of the economics of the Scottish independence scenario.  
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3 Path to the Independence Referendum 
 
Before discussing the economic themes of Scottish independence in detail, this chapter 
aims at explaining the framework and history for the scenario of independence for 
Scotland and briefly summarising the outcome of the referendum of September 2014. 
 
Scotland has a long tradition of independence thoughts and movements, typically with 
the Scottish National Party (SNP) in the vanguard. Already in 1967 Winnie Ewing won 
the first ever seat in the Westminster parliament for the SNP, which at the time was 
sensational and paved the way for the SNP (The Scotsman, 2007). In 1979, the first 
referendum on devolution was held. Even though a tiny majority of 52% voted in fa-
vour of devolution, a previously set quota that 40% of total electorate should vote in 
favour  (the Cunningham Amendment to the Scotland Act 1978) was not reached: the 
turnout was 63,6%, meaning 32,9% of total electorate voted “Yes” (Scottish Political 
Archive, 2006). Consequently, the status quo continued. It took until September 1997 
before Scottish people were asked again. This time needed to decide whether there 
should be a Scottish parliament and if a Scottish parliament should have tax-varying 
powers. Both proposals were accepted by the majority and the UK parliament passed 
the Scotland Act 1998 shortly after. The act established a Scottish parliament (first 
election held on 6 May 1999) and an own Scottish government lead by the First Minis-
ter (Scotland Act 1998). It defines the legislative powers of the parliament by stating 
which powers remain with the central UK parliament (reserved powers). So everything 
else that is not explicitly stated as reserved, is within the legislative competence of the 
Scottish parliament (devolved powers). The reserved powers, as detailed in Schedule 5 
of the act (Scotland Act 1998: 82-100), mainly concern the constitution, foreign affairs, 
public service, defence, finance and economy, home affairs, trade and industry, ener-
gy, transport, social security, employment, media and culture, and some areas of 
health and medicine. Consequently, the following aspects are considered devolved: 
education, housing, judiciary and police, agriculture, forestry and fishery, environmen-
tal matters, heritage, sports and tourism, some aspects of economic development, and 
some of healthcare.  
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The funding for Scotland continued to come from a block grant from the UK using the 
Barnett Formula to calculate annual adjustments. So the money for activities of the 
Scottish parliament did not come from Scottish taxes, nor was it in any way linked to 
the performance of Scotland’s economy (Gallent, 2000). As mentioned above, the ref-
erendum covered the question whether the Scottish parliament should have the power 
to adjust taxes but taxation, as a matter regarding finance and economy, remained 
reserved. The one exception is income tax; the Scottish government was given the 
right to adjust the basic rate of UK income tax by up to three percent (Scotland Act 
1998: 32). This power has, however, never been used. 
 
So this marked a first step of autonomy for Scotland, giving it the opportunity to pur-
sue certain policy entirely focused on Scotland. Higher education is, for example, free 
of charge in Scotland while there are tuition fees in the RUK and a ban on smoking in 
public places was first introduced in Scotland (BBC, 2006). But still the vast majority of 
decisions, especially regarding the economy, were taken at Westminster and Scotland 
did not benefit more from its own economic success than before. 
 
During the next years, some minor amendments to the act were implemented. In 
2007, the SNP campaigned for the upcoming Scottish parliament elections with the 
promise to hold a referendum on independence (BBC, 2007) and emerged as the win-
ning party. They were, however, not able to fulfil their promise, as they did not have a 
majority in parliament (The Scotsman, 2014) and all other parties were opposed to the 
idea of holding an independence referendum. The next election in 2011 changed this 
picture: The SNP won the majority of the seats (BBC, 2011) and were now able to pur-
sue this goal without needing support of any other party. An important step was taken 
in October 2012 when the so-called Edinburgh Agreement was signed by the two gov-
ernments agreeing on the general terms and conditions of the referendum (Scottish 
Government, 2012a). In early 2013, the exact wording of the question was agreed 
upon (Carrell, 2013) and in March the date for the referendum was set to 18 Septem-
ber 2014. 
 
In the meantime, the Scotland Act 2012 was passed devolving considerably more pow-
ers to the Scottish parliament, namely regarding taxation (adjusting income tax by up 
to ten percent and additional minor tax powers, such as tax on land transactions), the 
ability to borrow money (up to £2.2 billion) and other, non-economic aspects, including 
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guaranteed Scottish representation in the BBC or powers related to driving and drug 
use (Scotland Act 2012). The act will, however, come only into force in 2016. This is 
particularly curious because two days before the referendum, the leaders of the three 
main UK parties, David Cameron, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg published a joint state-
ment promising to transfer more powers to Holyrood2. They “guaranteed” extensive 
new powers for the Scottish parliament and that it would be a permanent part of the 
British constitution (Clegg, 2014). They furthermore promised to keep the Barnett for-
mula as a tool for allocating the Scottish budget, give Scotland power to raise its own 
funds and make the final decision on spending on public services in Scotland. They 
also addressed the issue of the National Health Service by promising that Scottish peo-
ple will decide whether or not to keep it in public. 
 
To what extent the vow contributed to the outcome of the referendum may be the 
topic of another debate. Nonetheless independence was turned down on 18 September 
2014 with a majority of 55.3 percent voting against and a turnout of 84.6 percent. In 
only four out of 32 areas did the majority vote “Yes”. (BBC, 2014) For the case that the 
outcome would have been in favour of independence, the proposed date of independ-
ence was 24 March 2016, allowing about 18 months for negotiations and procedures to 
take place (McKenna, 2013).  
                                                
2 The term ”Holyrood” is used as a synonym for the Scottish parliament and government. It is 
the name of the area where the Scottish parliament building is located. 
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4 Economics of Constitutional Change 
 
The objective of this chapter is to set the constitutional context for the economic de-
bate. It briefly explains constitutional models that have been proposed in Scotland and 
then identifies the predominant factors of the economics of constitutional change with 
reference to the Scottish case and illustrates their interdependencies. 
 
 
4.1 Constitutional Models 
 
Constitutional change does not necessarily mean that, for example, a region without 
any, or very limited, autonomy becomes an independent country with full powers from 
one day to another. The way to independence usually consists of many small steps of 
gaining more autonomy and often takes decades and various attempts. As detailed 
above, also Scotland at first reached for some powers and limited autonomy, and this 
was achieved only in the late 1990’s (The Scotsman, 2014). 
 
Consequently, independence was not the only option to continue Scotland’s strive for 
greater autonomy thereafter. Indeed, various models with different levels of self-
determination covering the entire range from a renunciation of devolution to full sover-
eignty were discussed. Two of the more popular ones, besides the status quo and in-
dependence, were the so-called Devo Plus and Devo Max models. The former, sup-
ported by a cross-party initiative of liberal democrats, labour and before the referen-
dum conservatives (Carrel, 2012), proposes a model of devolution, which would give 
Scotland control of many aspects of welfare (leaving namely state pension and sick-
ness payment reserved) and increase tax raising powers (Scotland would control up to 
approximately two-thirds of taxes including corporate and income tax). Scotland would 
also be rewarded with a geographical share of North Sea oil revenues. Devo plus aims 
at making Scotland more accountable. It would have to raise the money it wants to 
spend (Gordon, 2014). The latter, the Devo Max model, provides even more autonomy 
for Scotland. It adds the power over national insurance, state pension and raising the 
vast majority of tax. There are, however, several variations to this model, for example 
regarding the control over Value Added Tax. Nevertheless, Scotland would then have 
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to pay the central UK administration for shared services. These would mainly be de-
fence and foreign affairs. It is also suggested that matters such as financial, employ-
ment and competition regulation would remain reserved, meaning that the central UK 
government would still control them. The two concepts should, however, not be seen 
as definite, and, especially Devo Max has been criticised for lacking clarity and precise 
information (Buchanan, 2012). 
 
Taking Devo Plus and Devo Max as two examples of more profound versions of devolu-
tion, the most important and thus distinctive factor obviously is the degree of political 
independence within the union with the RUK. Likewise there are variations of the con-
stitutional model of independence, although the theoretically unlimited degree of politi-
cal independence is, by design, the common pillar. To what extent a state decides to 
exercise its independence may vary. While it is hardly argued that countries such as 
France or Germany3 are fully independent, they have decided to join the European 
Union (EU). Even more, they have become members of the European Monetary Union, 
adopted the Euro as their currency and consequently handed over substantial powers 
to EU institutions, in particular regarding monetary policy (Scheller, 2006), which other 
independent countries still hold. Goudie (2013) also uses the question of currency and 
monetary policy to distinguish different models of independence. He identifies fives 
sets of plausible constitutional models for Scotland: 
• The devolution settlement of the Scotland Act 2012  
• The Devo Plus proposal 
• The Devo Max proposal 
• Independence within a monetary union 
• Independence with own currency 
The option of independence within a monetary union might be even further divided. 
The Yes-campaign has proposed that Scotland would continue using the pound, pref-
erably as part of a currency union with the RUK (Scottish Government, 2013a: 3). 
However, UK politicians, for example George Osborne (2014), made it clear that they 
did not want Scotland to be part of the UK monetary union. Although this may be 
mainly seen as an attempt to scare voters not to vote for independence (Watt, 2014), 
the model of Scotland using the sterling without formal approval of the RUK, and the 
                                                
3 This is leaving aside (conspiracy) theories for example regarding German sovereignty 
(Deutsche Welle, 2013). 
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consequences, deserve consideration. Figure 1 below illustrates the structure of possi-
ble and plausible constitutional arrangements. 
 
 
Figure 1. Constitutional Arrangements, based on Goudie (2013: 21), edited 
 
All of the proposed models and their economic implications are worth discussing. After 
the No-vote this is particularly true for the Devo Plus and Devo Max model, as a new 
wave of devolution was promised prior to the referendum for the case of a No-vote 
(Clegg, 2014). For the purpose of this thesis, the focus hereafter will be primarily on 
the scenario of independence and its different types. 
 
 
4.2 Economic Factors and Interdependencies  
 
While the choice of the model is necessarily the predominant one when considering 
constitutional change, it is essential to understand the interdependence of the subse-
quent decisions regarding economic policy. It is therefore crucial to establish a frame-
work of the most important decisions following independence and look at their respec-
tive hierarchy. This is attempted below. 
 
As shown in Figure 1 and briefly explained above, one choice with an immense impact 
on many other topics in an independent Scotland is the pick of a currency. The curren-
cy, or rather its structure, sharing with other countries or having an own one, is direct-
ly linked to monetary policy. The different possibilities, having an own currency, joining 
the euro, keeping the pound as part of a monetary union, or keeping the pound as a 
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unilateral decision, would lead to distinct monetary policy options for Scotland. Estab-
lishing a new Scottish currency, for example, would provide Scotland with direct clarity 
and power, as the outcome would not depend on negotiations with external partners. 
(Goudie, 2013) While in theory this would offer a great deal of flexibility, the actual 
policy options available might be limited. It seems likely that the new currency would 
be relatively volatile (Her Majesty (HM) Treasury, 2013: 92) if not pegged to a strong 
and established currency, such as the UK pound. Doing so is, again, a limitation of flex-
ibility and consequently reduces decision-making power. Moreover, keeping and de-
fending a peg might proof to be difficult. In order to do so, it can be assumed that 
Scotland would need to run consecutive fiscal surpluses, which would logically lead to 
stricter fiscal policy, directly impacting spending and taxation decisions (Kay, 2013). 
Already this simplified example illustrates the great degree of interdependence of eco-
nomic aspects and the primary importance of the currency question, which will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in chapter 5.1, as the first of the macroeconomic themes. Also 
the fiscal policy framework and its implications for the wellbeing of independent Scot-
land’s economy are considered (chapter 5.2). The financials of a new Scottish state is 
another key debate, among both politicians and academics, in particular because relia-
ble data is scarce (Goudie, 2013). A core element is the inheritance of national debt; 
its allocation directly impacts Scotland’s fiscal balance and has, again, consequences 
for further policy actions (Goodheart, 2013). 
 
Next to the macroeconomic discussion the focus should also be on what independence 
would mean in microeconomic terms. After taking a look at how greater autonomy 
would, or potentially could, impact economic growth (chapter 6.1), microeconomic 
aspects that are vital to Scotland’s success are closely examined. This includes higher 
education and research and development, energy and, of course, the story of North 
Sea oil and gas. The latter is of particular interest because oil revenues have been a 
central argument of the Yes-campaign (for example, Scottish Government, 2013b) and 
it is a sector on which constitutional change, in the forms proposed, has relatively little 
impact. 
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5 Macroeconomic Themes 
 
Macroeconomic topics are extremely important for the prospect of any economy. If 
Scotland were to become independent, a framework would have to be quickly devel-
oped. As discussed already, the currency choice appears to be a reasonable starting 
point and is hence analysed below. Afterwards also fiscal policy and Scotland’s financial 
situation and structure are evaluated. 
 
 
5.1 Currency and Monetary Policy 
 
The options that an independent Scotland could consider are, as mentioned before: 
• Adopting the euro 
• Continuing to use the pound within a monetary union with the RUK 
• Continuing to use the pound without monetary union membership 
• Introducing an own currency, pegged or floating 
All of the scenarios will now be discussed in more detail.  
 
 
5.1.1 The Euro 
 
One of the main objectives of the Yes-campaign was that Scotland would be a member 
of the EU (Scottish Government, 2013c). It seems unlikely that Scotland would inherit 
the UK’s opt-out from the Eurozone4 (Curtis, 2014). Hence, Scotland would be ex-
pected to adopt the euro eventually. In order to qualify formally, a country needs to 
fulfil the convergence criteria (also known as Maastricht criteria), which are: 
• Inflation must not be more than 1.5 percent above the average inflation rate of 
the three EU member states with the lowest rate for the previous year, 
• National budget deficit must be no more than three percent of gross domestic 
produt (GDP),  
• National public debt must not exceed 60 percent of GDP, 
                                                
4 Unfortunately, an in-depth analysis on EU and Eurozone membership of newly founded inde-
pendent Scotland is beyond the scope of this thesis. A detailed but very accessible discussion of 
the arguments is provided by Polly Curtis (2013).  
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• Long-term interest rates must not be more than two percent higher than the 
average rate of the three EU members with the lowest inflation rate for the 
previous year, 
• The national currency should enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism two years 
prior to the introduction of the euro in that country (Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: art. 140) 
Although the criteria have been undermined by various countries, especially early on 
by France and Germany, it is to be expected that Scotland would have to follow them. 
There might arguably be room for negotiation on the last criterion. There has, howev-
er, never been a similar case (Kay, 2013).  
 
Adopting, or even planning to adopt, the euro would consequently mean a direct im-
pact on fiscal policy. While the exact share of the debt Scotland would inherit from the 
UK is not entirely clear (see chapter 5.3 below), future spending and taxation promises 
would have to be tested against the aforementioned criteria. Even more importantly, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) is responsible for monetary policy (Scheller, 2006), 
for instance, determining all levels of interest rates, and thus Scotland would have to 
hand this power over. According to Kay’s analysis (2013), there would then be a pre-
mium or discount on Scottish rates reflecting its (perceived) creditworthiness relative 
to the other member states. In return, Scotland would be granted representation at 
the governing council of the ECB and could in this way influence decision-making. With 
around 20 Eurozone members, the influence of one, relatively small, country such as 
Scotland would be limited. Scotland would also be expected to participate in already 
existing arrangements, for example the stability mechanism. 
 
While joining the euro is considerably a feasible option for an independent Scotland in 
the long-run, this cannot be said for the time being. It is generally agreed that the Eu-
rozone members have not found solutions for many of their issues. Some even argue 
that the euro does more harm than good; Elliot (2014) provides an overview of this 
debate. Kay (2013) also argues that Scottish membership of the Eurozone does neither 
make sense for Scotland nor the current members, as long as the RUK does not use 
the euro. 
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5.1.2 Monetary Union with RUK 
 
This option would be the closest to the status quo and come with little change (Scot-
tish Government, 2013a). The Bank of England would continue in its role as a central 
bank, also for independent Scottish territory. Ideally, ownership and governance would 
be shared between the two countries while the bank itself would remain independent 
from political swings and monetary policy would be set looking at the needs of the un-
ion as a whole. This is at least the desired scenario of the Scottish government, as 
stated, for example, by John Swinney (2012). The Fiscal Commission Working Group 
(Fiscal Commission Working Group, 2013a: ch.2.5) furthermore claims that it would be 
in the best interest of the RUK, too, to create a currency union with a new Scottish 
state. They counter concerns that Scotland would be too weak to participate in this 
system by pointing at the relative wellbeing of the economy of Scotland, especially 
compared to other parts of the UK. 
 
Nonetheless, there are significant other issues. Even though, there would not be a fis-
cal union, both countries would have to come to an agreement on fiscal conditions. 
The tightening or loosing of the fiscal policy in one country would directly impact the 
other. In particular with the euro crisis still going on, it is highly unlikely that the RUK 
would not want insights on Scottish finances, and desire significant control over them. 
There would possibly be a cap on Scottish deficits and debt levels (Kay, 2013). Yet, the 
Eurozone experience with the Maastricht criteria shows how difficult it might be to en-
force those agreements. While the RUK might at least have the threat of being much 
bigger, Scotland could hardly exert any control over the degree of fiscal prudence of 
the RUK, even in the unlikely case that the RUK would grant Scotland this power in 
theory. Similarly it can be assumed that monetary policy for the currency union would 
be much more focused on favouring the large part of the union, the RUK. 
 
This arrangement certainly has its benefits, such as the avoidance of placing extra bar-
riers on the trade between the two countries. Also, while this scenario seems to require 
relatively little change, it does make Scotland more independent in theory. In practise, 
Scotland might end up being dependent on and dominated by the RUK, with regards to 
both monetary, and to a certain degree, fiscal policy (Kay, 2013). After all, the option 
of forming a currency union with Scotland has been rejected by ruling UK politicians 
(for example, Osborne (2014 )). 
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5.1.3 Unilateral Use of Sterling 
 
If Scotland does not reach agreement with the RUK to form a currency union but still 
wishes to keep the pound, it can, of course, do so unilaterally through so-called dollari-
sation. Even though this action is usually not appreciated by the institution issuing the 
currency, there is hardly anything it can do about it and several examples exist, one of 
the most prominent ones being Ecuador’s adoption of the US dollar in 2000 (World 
Factbook: Ecuador). Other examples include smaller, and often less prosperous coun-
tries as for example European microstates (Andorra, Monaco) or Montenegro (Europe-
an Commission, 2014) For these small countries it makes sense in order to avoid the 
immense costs and complexity associated with the apparatus needed for an own cur-
rency and a central bank. That there is, according to Kay (2013), “no modern analogue 
for the adoption of such policy by a country of the size and economic sophistication of 
Scotland” indicates the significance of the disadvantages associated with dollarization. 
First of all, a country following this system has neither influence on monetary policy 
nor access to a central bank, and no analogue institution on its own. It does, further-
more, not derive any benefits of seigniorage. This is the profit gained from printing 
notes and minting coins that usually the central bank of a country collects (Feige, 
2013). Also the reserve deposits commercial banks have to make at the central banks 
yield a profit, which countries unilaterally using another country’s currency do not re-
ceive. Moreover, such a country will have to import great amounts of the other curren-
cy so its people would be able to use it and its banking system enabled to fully func-
tion. In order to achieve this, it has to run significant trade surpluses or borrow from 
the country with that currency. Either way requires implicit monetary and fiscal disci-
pline (Kay, 2013). This is also the downside for Scotland. It would be able to keep the 
pound but at the cost of a great deal of its independence. 
 
 
5.1.4 The Scottish Pound 
 
If none of the options above seems desirable or possible, Scotland could decide to in-
troduce its own, new currency. This is the most independent choice. Scotland could 
have its own central bank, control the issuance of the money and adopt policies as it 
wishes (Kay, 2013). The dominant decision would then be whether a Scottish currency 
should be freely floating or pegged. Pegging a currency means fixing its exchange rate 
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to a reference currency (or a basket of currencies). For Scotland, the most reasonable 
scenario might be a peg to the pound Sterling due to the high degree of integration 
between the economies and their obvious proximity. 
 
Fixing the exchange rate has significant advantages, in particular for businesses oper-
ating in both countries, as it reduces exchange rate risks to a minimum. Also a fixed 
system decreases volatility and fluctuation of prices. Moreover, a country that is able to 
maintain a peg to a well-performing economy, earns credibility (Kay, 2013). This, how-
ever, points out one of the greatest disadvantages. Once a country decides to peg its 
currency to another, it must be able to hold and defend the peg. Right from the begin-
ning the country is required to have strong reserves of both currencies in order to keep 
the fixed rate (Kay, 2013). Scotland would likely start independence with a share of UK 
foreign exchange reserves of around £10 billion, based on a population share (Arm-
strong, 2013), which in modern world’s financial terms is minimal. According to the 
governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, countries using a foreign currency peg 
should have at least 25 percent of their GDP as foreign exchange reserves (Cadman 
and O’Connor, 2014). In the same article it is also noted that Hong Kong, a country 
with a large financial sector, has piled up reserves of 110 percent of its GDP. It is thus 
estimated that Scotland would need between £32 and £163 billion in reserves. This 
illustrates that a country pegging its currency cannot use monetary and fiscal policy 
entirely freely and could, in contrast, be forced to severe austerity action. 
 
A valid market concern is that Scotland would not be able to maintain a peg in some 
situations or attempt to devaluate the currency, for example to increase the competi-
tiveness of Scottish exporters. This is a dangerous one-sided option. The Scottish cur-
rency could only decrease in value but not increase again (Kay, 2013). A likely out-
come is that interest rates would increase or that parts of Scottish business would be 
done in another currency, or both. Scotland’s own central bank is then in the situation 
where it has to closely follow the actions taken by the reference central bank in order 
to keep the rate balanced. It can be, for example argued that Denmark’s monetary 
policy is de facto conducted by the ECB (Kay, 2013). Denmark is not part of the Euro-
zone but has pegged its rate to the euro and will have to consistently adapt to ECB 
policies without the ability to influence them.  
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This dependency might, however, even take place if Scotland decided to let its curren-
cy float. This is shown by the case of Sweden. The Swedish krone is not pegged to any 
currency but, in order to enjoy a relatively stable exchange rate to major Swedish trad-
ing partners, i.e. the EU, Sweden has to react to policy changes of the Eurozone (Kay, 
2013). So the promise of complete independence coming from having an own currency 
that is freely floating might likely only exist in theory. Additionally, as for example not-
ed by Julius (in Financial Times, 2014) transaction costs for businesses operating 
cross-boarder would increase and the initial period of uncertainty following independ-
ence may cause capital flight. The transaction costs could be controlled to a certain 
extent by regulatory framework allowing easy, cheap and fast transaction of money, 
which then, on the other side, could be used for currency speculation.  
 
 
5.1.5 Summary 
 
All in all, Scotland has various currency options but none of them seems altogether 
satisfactory. In the end, it is a trade off between autonomy and security or certainty. 
The option of the unilateral use of the pound seems to be, in theory, the middle way. 
But this would be unchartered territory and come with great uncertainty. The best 
economic outcome for Scotland, as acknowledged by the Yes-camp, would be currency 
union with the RUK (Scottish Government, 2013c). This could, though, put a drastic 
end to the dreams of fiscal autonomy linked to political independence. This leaves the 
option of a new Scottish currency, which would likely, at least in the beginning, be 
pegged to the pound sterling. While this could lead to a relatively difficult start of inde-
pendence, it can be assumed that Scotland could over time develop a respected and 
internationally well tradable currency, as many other countries have. Arguably this 
scenario would not live up to the hopes and expectations of Scotland. This, however, 
as Kay (2013) puts it, “reflects the acknowledgment of a central reality”. The level of 
economic independence countries, such as the aforementioned Denmark and Sweden, 
enjoy when trading with large partners or currency unions, is simply limited. Still those 
two, and many more, are wealthy and prosperous countries. 
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5.2 Fiscal Policy 
 
The considerations about independent Scotland’s fiscal policy are, as explained in 
chapter 5.1, closely linked to and dependent on the currency choice. This chapter takes 
the approach of looking at good fiscal policy in general and discussing the implications 
for Scotland.  
 
According to O’Donnell (2013), good fiscal policy should be sustainable, supporting the 
economy and enhancing (social) equity. The first one refers to the principal that gov-
ernment spending should be in general matched by collected revenues. If not, debt 
level will rise, which also means interest payments increase, leading ultimately to high-
er risk for creditors. This would be compensated for by increased interest rates, which 
again lead to more borrowing and by chance to an explosive situation. Sustainable 
policies can exist with high debt levels, too. It does, however, require bigger primary 
surpluses (O’Donnell, 2013). 
 
Supporting the economy means, first of all, acting as a stabiliser. Fiscal policy plays an 
important role in managing shocks and tackling imbalances (Allsopp and Vines, 2005). 
It should in the long run also aim to enhance productivity and generally deliver a stable 
system for all participants. Taxation plays an important role, too. Finding the right mix 
is crucial as well as difficult. A Scottish government could take advantage of this and 
set incentives that best fit the needs of Scottish businesses, for example. 
 
The last characteristic aims at providing balanced support. Fiscal policy should also be 
used to redistribute income between both people and generations. A growing concern 
is, for example, the widening of the income gap in many societies. This is particularly 
true for the UK (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011) and 
hence would be a main challenge for an independent Scotland. 
 
Additionally Scotland will have to face an increasing number of older people needing 
expensive health care while the number of people working and paying taxes decreases 
(Lisenkova and Mérette, 2014). According to Emisch, et al (2009) Scotland should in-
deed be, more than other similar countries, concerned with its aging population and 
shrinking labour force and will have to find ways to address the economic consequenc-
es. Also the Scottish system tends to be more generous than the current UK system in 
terms of welfare spending. According to the plans of the SNP, spending should be even 
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further increased (Scottish Government, 2013c). Given the importance of income from 
North Sea sources, and its relative volatility, this would require even more careful 
budget planning. In addition, as global competition keeps continuously increasing, the 
pressure to produce at the lowest possible costs grows, also regarding energy and tax 
costs. So countries trying to increase their competitiveness through lowering taxation 
could end up in a dangerous race to the bottom.  
 
All in all, an independent Scotland would have the chance to create a stable and bene-
ficial fiscal policy framework, including a tax system tailored to its specific needs and 
without the toxic complexity of the UK system. This is under the assumption that Scot-
land would enjoy significant freedom in its policy design and overcomes an initial peri-
od of turmoil possibly directly following independence. Also, while North Sea revenues 
promise wealth and hence less pressure to collect money from other sources in the 
following decades, they will not flow forever and should, at least partially, be retained. 
In the future Scotland will have to face challenges for which it would be advised to 
save already.  
 
 
5.3 Scotland’s Financial Position 
 
One major change independence would bring is that Scotland would be responsible for 
its financing entirely alone; this is currently done by the Debt Management Office from 
London (Goodhart, 2013). Already from its Independence Day on, Scotland would most 
likely have to face considerable amounts of debt, simply inherited from the UK. The 
exact amount is very difficult to predict and would, obviously, depend on negotiations 
and the amount of UK debt at that time. Two models have been suggested that try to 
give an approximate picture of the situation. The first one bases the calculation on a 
per capita, the second one on a historic share. Historic information on public spending 
and tax receipts in Scotland has been gathered since 1980 and published in the Gov-
ernment Expenditure and Revenue Scotland report (Scottish Government, 2012b). As 
roughly 90 percent of UK debt has been accumulated in the last 35 years (Scottish 
Government, 2013d), the historic share model uses this data. 
 
A Scottish government calculation based on the two models using the figures for UK 
total debt of £1.1 trillion from 2012 yielded an estimated public sector net debt for 
Scotland of £92 billion (per capita share) and £56 billion (historic share; Scottish Gov-
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ernment, 2013d). This means that Scotland’s debt to GDP ratio would be around 63 
(per capita share) or 38 percent (historic share). On a future Independence Day, these 
numbers are likely to be higher; already in June 2014, UK public sector net debt 
reached about £1.3 trillion (Office for National Statistics, 2014a). Using the calculation 
based on a population share of 8.5 percent, this would bring Scottish debt up to about 
£110.5 billion. Both scenarios would leave Scotland with a lower ratio than the UK be-
cause Scotland’s GDP per capita is slightly higher than the UK average due to offshore 
revenues (62 or 38 percent for Scotland and about 72 percent for the UK in 2012 
(Scottish Government, 2013d)).  
 
The management of the then existing debt and borrowing more would ergo be an in-
cremental part of Scotland’s Finances. The structure of its institutions dealing with pub-
lic finances would largely depend on the currency adopted. Besides the estimation of 
public sector net debt that can be done with some prudence and the question how the 
debt would be transferred and restructured, which, however, is too detailed for the 
scope of this thesis, an important consideration is the cost of future borrowings in in-
dependent Scotland. Goodhart (2013), for example, states that “Scotland might face 
an additional risk premium on its own debt”. One reason for premia is that the volume 
of a new debt issue is relatively small, thus trades less frequently and has therefore a 
larger bid/ask spread (Goodhart, 2013). If Scotland were to decide to issue amounts 
big enough to boost liquidity, it is reasonable to assume that those amounts would be 
relatively large compared to Scotland’s overall finances. Repayments could come at an 
inappropriate time and refinancing between large issues of debt would have to rely on 
short-term financing. Goodhart (2013) uses the finding of Bernoth, van Hagen and 
Schuknecht (2004) that “an increase of the relative debt size by one percent causes a 
reduction of the issuer country’s interest rate by around 0.7 basis points” to calculate 
that Scotland could be faced with interest rates up to almost one percent higher than 
the UK due to liquidity premia. 
 
It should also be noted that markets, with the experience of the euro crisis in mind, 
would likely require higher interest rates. Even in a currency union with the RUK, Scot-
land might be seen as a small and peripheral part, even more so if it decided to join 
the Eurozone (Goodhart, 2013). If Scotland would have its own currency, risk premia 
would likely be even greater as exchange rate risks for any non-Scottish institution 
would have to be added. So there is definitely a lot of uncertainty regarding Scotland’s 
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cost of debt and it is impossible to prudently predict an exact rate. It can be assumed 
that Scotland will face relatively larger costs (than the UK), in particular in the first 
years following independence, when it has no established record as a debtor yet. 
 
Another question of similar difficulty is how Scotland’s financial position would develop 
over time. The Scottish Government projects a sound long-term financial position for 
Scotland (Scottish Government, 2014a). This projection relies heavily on strong eco-
nomic recovery and high revenues from North Sea oil and gas. It is furthermore obvi-
ously written with a political purpose. So generally, it can be said that Scotland’s fi-
nances will very much depend on the development of its own and the global economy 
and on decisions by the elected governments. 
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6 Microeconomic Themes 
 
After discussing the dominant macroeconomic factors, the focus of this part is on mi-
croeconomic considerations. At first, the impact of greater autonomy on growth is ana-
lysed from this perspective. Afterwards, key industries of Scotland’s economy and their 
interrelationship with independence is evaluated. The main focus is on Scotland’s oil 
and gas industry. 
 
 
6.1 Impact of Greater Autonomy on Economic Growth 
 
One of the central arguments of Scottish nationalists is that transferring more, and 
ultimately full, power from Westminster to Holyrood would enable Scotland’s economy 
to perform stronger and grow at a higher pace. They point at Scotland’s improvement 
in for example productivity, gross value added (GVA) or employment, all relative to the 
UK average, since devolution (Scottish Government, 2013d). The Scottish government 
argues that this is due to its “ability to use even limited levers in the interest of Scot-
land” (Scottish Government, 2013e). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to ex-
amine in detail whether those improvements can in fact be linked to devolution, the 
general assumptions that more devolution directly leads to greater efficiency and in-
creased economic growth has been challenged in earlier studies. Bwire and Rodríguez-
Pose (2003) for example found “no evidence of a positive and robust correlation be-
tween the inception of regional autonomy or of increases in transfers of resources to 
regional and state governments and a better economic performance than under a 
more centralized regime”. Also according to McLaren et al (2011) Scotland’s overall 
economic performance was very similar to the one of the UK as a whole since the de-
volution of 1998. 
 
Nonetheless, the Yes-camp argues that Scotland is kept beneath its actual potential by 
the central UK government. This is illustrated by, for example, the average annual 
growth rate of GDP in Scotland and the UK: Between 1977 and 2007 that rate of Scot-
land was 2.4 and the one of the UK 2.9 percent (Scottish Government, 2013f). In con-
trast, it should be noted that now the GDP per capita of Scotland (£20,571 excluding 
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oil and gas) is very close to the average of the UK (£20,873; BBC, 2013). It is, howev-
er, important to take the regionally polarised economy of the UK into account. There 
are only two regions, London and the South East, that have values above the average. 
Together they account for about 37 percent of total UK GVA (Office for National Statis-
tics, 2014b)5. So in this context the argument that Scotland could improve as an inde-
pendent country is not surprising. 
 
One, to some extent, simplified way to approach the question of how Scotland’s econ-
omy would develop with greater autonomy/independence, is to look at the impact on 
the country’s GDP. Although using GDP to measure prosperity can be criticised (Stiglitz, 
Sen and Fitoussi, 2009), it still gives a good general overview of economic performance 
and can be relatively easily broken down into its parts. These parts can then be ana-
lysed with reference to the changes that independence would assumingly cause. 
 
McGregor and Swales (2013) have taken this approach. They look at it from a supply-
side perspective and identify population, participation rate and labour productivity as 
key determinants for economic growth (measured in GDP). Over the last decades Scot-
land has had a stable population level of slightly above five million people National 
Records of Scotland, 2014). For economic growth a growing population is desirable, 
especially in terms of skilled people. In this way, a favourable labour market would 
increase immigration (of skilled workers) and simultaneously reduce out-migration due 
to economic reasons. 
 
One factor influencing the participation rate is demographics. As already mentioned 
several times, Scotland is faced with an aging population; the greater the population 
share of retired people, the smaller the amount of people who are able to partici-
pate/work. This again shows the importance of dealing with the issue of aging popula-
tion and how important a focus on immigration may be. Also typically wealth, health- 
and childcare, skill and labour demand policies to have a positive effect on the partici-
pation rate (McGregor and Swales, 2013), which could perhaps be more in the focus 
after independence. Currently, Scotland enjoys a participation rate slightly above UK 
average (Office for National Statistics, 2014c). 
 
                                                
5 GVA is used in this case due to the lack of comparable GDP data.  
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Regarding labour productivity, McGregor and Swales (2013) identify a number of fac-
tors of importance, for example the contribution of capital. They also point at human 
capital and how labour productivity is positively affected by an increase in human capi-
tal. As Scotland is known for having some of the best universities in the world and a 
great education system in general, this factor is particularly dominant. Hermannsson et 
al (2012: 21) find that maintaining the level of annual graduates from Scottish univer-
sities of 2006 will, in the long run, increase Scotland’s GDP by six percent.  
 
Perhaps the most crucial component of labour productivity is technological develop-
ment McGregor and Swales, 2013). The way technological change may take place is 
also influenced by the institutional setting (Acemoglu and Autor, 2012), which would 
be obviously impacted by independence. Additionally, technological development is 
driven by a skilled workforce and can, for example, be encouraged by governments 
through tax incentives (McGregor and Swales, 2013). 
 
The level of government expenditure in an independent Scotland will obviously have a 
great impact on the previously mentioned key determinants. Currently, the budget for 
Scottish government spending is allocated through the Barnett formula (Ferguson, 
2003). This means that the amount of money available for Scotland is determined by 
the amount the UK wants to spend and the population share of Scotland. As already 
mentioned in previous sections, public spending budget in Scotland is not related to 
taxes raised in Scotland or in any way linked to how much Scotland would need. One 
example in which this could lead to a disadvantage for Scotland is the financing of the 
higher education sector. If the UK, for example, decides to continue the push of uni-
versity financing towards private funding and student loans, public spending would be 
reduced and, hence, using the Barnett formula, Scotland’s budget would also be cut by 
a relative share, even though Scotland might want to prioritise public financing of 
higher education more. The Scottish government does, however, have some freedom 
on where it wants to spend the money. So if the UK decides to cut spending on higher 
education, Scotland does not necessarily have to reduce its spending in that field sim-
ultaneously; it can also decide to spend less on other sectors. 
 
Moreover, the Scotland Act 2012 will place more power in the hand of Scotland’s gov-
ernment, as for example varying the rate of income tax by up to ten percent and in-
creased freedom to borrow money (Scotland Act 2012). However, it is questionable 
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that any Scottish government as part of the UK would be allowed to implement fiscal 
policy that differs drastically from the one of the central UK government (McGregor and 
Swales, 2013). 
 
Another debate is about the impact (on efficiency) of the degree of local funding. Cur-
rently, and there is little change to this under Scotland Act 2012, Scottish finances do 
not directly profit from greater economic growth in Scotland. So with independence, or 
also greater devolution for a matter of fact, Scotland would be able to only spend the 
money it generates. This should arguably improve the efficiency and lead to better 
decision-making, which then turns into higher economic growth. Additionally, if the 
Scottish government has to rely solely on the taxes it collects, it should theoretically be 
more focused on increasing the tax base through economic growth (McGregor and 
Swales, 2013). Another argument discussed by McGregor and Swales (2013) is that a 
government that is not responsible for its own funding might not (have to) spend its 
money responsibly because it would be bailed out by the central government eventual-
ly. So this would encourage risky promises and decision-making and harm future 
growth. However, in the Scottish case, this argument is minor, as Scotland’s budget 
actually has to be balanced from year to year. 
 
Furthermore the behaviour of voters might be affected by independence. The assump-
tion is that under the status quo, Scottish voters are not encouraged to vote for politi-
cians with agendas focused on (long term) economic growth. Instead, voters suppos-
edly favour political agendas with a focus on current spending, because Scotland and 
its people would hardly benefit from the growth, but receive all the benefits of in-
creased current spending. According to McGregor and Swales (2013), this behaviour 
might change with independence and a more growth-oriented agenda would be im-
plemented. On the other hand, there are also clear disadvantages of greater local 
funding. It is overall only beneficial if the growth in Scotland is greater than the aver-
age of the UK. Also the Scottish economy and the tax base are smaller and less diversi-
fied. This means greater uncertainty for tax revenues, in particular if taking into ac-
count the dominance of North Sea oil and gas, which are not at all guaranteed. 
 
Another key point is the mix of taxes an independent country can set itself. Scotland 
does assumingly have better information about the local economy and can thus more 
efficiently channel (tax) policies (Fiscal Commission Working Group, 2013b). Scotland 
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could then also independently vary its corporation tax rate, for example. Ireland is of-
ten taken as a role model; after deploying a low corporation tax rate, its economy ex-
perienced rapid growth and great inflow of foreign direct investment (McGregor and 
Swales, 2013).  
 
The border that would be placed between Scotland and the RUK is an important factor, 
too. In 2012, Scottish exports to the RUK were estimated at £47.6 billion (excluding oil 
and gas), meaning that exports to the RUK made up about 65 percent of all Scottish 
exports (Scottish Government, 2014b). Moreover, Ashcroft (2014) analyses that “al-
most 1 million jobs – 962,000 – depend on links to the rest of the UK”.It is, however, 
not clear, or in anyway easy to estimate, how a national border would impact trade. 
Looking at literature about the subject, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) state that there is 
“a considerable degree of home bias in trade”, meaning that trade within a country is 
greater than international trade. The most studied border is perhaps the one between 
Canada and the United States of America. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), for ex-
ample, find a significant impact of the border: they claim that “national borders reduce 
trade between the US and Canada by about 44%”. It is, however, not exactly clear 
what the underlying reasons are. But it seems reasonable that tariffs and non-tariff 
border barriers, exchange rate exposures and, to some extent, higher ship-
ping/transportation costs play a role (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001). Evans (2000) also 
suggests that social and cultural factors play a role, for example domestic networks 
and language. 
 
While it is generally difficult to estimate the effect the new border would have on Scot-
land’s economy, some of the assumed reasons that seem to pose a big barrier could be 
minor in this case. The currency is an obvious example; keeping the pound sterling 
would most likely reduce the detrimental impact of a border. This is even truer if it 
were agreed that Scotland would stay in the Common Travel Area, a travel zone com-
promising the UK and Ireland where border control is reduced to a minimum6.  
 
Moreover, the language is not a barrier in this case and also the existing level of inte-
gration of the economies indicates that business networks are well developed between 
                                                
6 It seems questionable that the plan of the Yes-campaign that an independent Scotland could 
be an EU member state and stay in the Common Travel Area would work. This topic has frankly 
not received much attention (Wright, 2013). 
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Scotland and the RUK. McGregor and Swales (2013) also argues that it is unlikely that 
“any government of an independent Scotland would not wish to encourage trade with 
the rest of the UK”. One aspect worth noting is though, that this might change over 
time. The Scottish government has pointed out that it would want to introduce policies, 
laws and regulations tailored to Scotland, i.e. different from the current ones. It can be 
assumed that greater difference in the regulatory framework might harm cross-border 
trade. 
 
 
6.2 Scottish Key Industries 
 
After discussing various macroeconomic themes and the general impact of independ-
ence on economic growth, another important topic is the linkage between independ-
ence and Scotland’s most important industries. In its Government Economic Growth 
Strategy report (2011), the Scottish Government identifies the sectors with significant 
economic impact and growth potential. These are: 
• Creative Industries 
• Energy and Renewables 
• Financial Services 
• Food and Drink 
• Life Science 
• Tourism 
• Higher Education 
All of them would be impacted by independence, some more than others. There is, for 
example, the question how the financial industry would react to independence and 
concerns have been raised that much of it would move to London (Goodhart, 2013). 
Other sectors that depend more on conventional exports, as for example the food and 
drink industry (Scottish Government, 2013f), would obviously be influenced by the 
choice of currency. 
 
Another aspect, often argued by the Yes-campaign, is that an independent Scotland 
could introduce policies more targeted towards its local industries. It is claimed that 
currently the UK operates a regime that is more focused on English businesses, par-
ticular in the London area and the South East (Scottish Government, 2013g). 
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While all these considerations could be discussed in much more detail, the arguably 
most relevant industry to the independence debate is oil and gas. Even though the 
influence that independence would have on it might be limited, its development would 
be crucial to an independent Scotland state. 
 
 
6.2.1 Oil and Gas 
 
The output of North Sea oil and gas, relative to the UK economy as a whole and con-
sequently also its contribution to UK public finances, is tremendous. For the fiscal year 
of 2011-12 the sector paid £11.2 billion in taxes (Kemp, 2013), making it the largest 
corporate taxpayer in the UK (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012), and employed around 
450,000 people in 2012 (BBC, 2015). 
 
As most of the oil (over 90 percent) and much of the gas (around 60 percent) are ex-
tracted from Scotland’s geographic share of the UK marine territory (the exact border-
line would, of course, depend on negotiations; Kemp, 2013; Scottish Government, 
2013b), it is not surprising that the topic of oil and gas has been much discussed prior 
to the referendum: the offshore revenues would be even more significant to Scotland’s 
economy. The Scottish government has outlined plans to use oil revenues to fund a 
greater welfare state and tax cuts, and even create an oil fund (Scottish Government, 
2013b), similar to the ones established in many other oil-rich countries, such as Nor-
way (Fiscal Commission Working Group, 2013c). 
 
While oil revenues can definitely boost an economy and increase welfare, there is also 
a downside of oil being a big part of the economy. Oil, or rather the oil price, is ex-
tremely exposed to the global economy and external shocks. This means, although 
Scotland could try to introduce more oil industry-friendly (tax) policies, that a country 
can hardly do anything about falling oil prices, in particular a country of Scotland’s size. 
This risk of exposure to volatile prices is even bigger if a country uses oil tax revenues 
as part of its annual budget (some countries have established funds to ensure long-
term benefits from their oil income (Recknagel, 2014). Figure 2 shows the develop-
ment of the crude oil price in the last 25 years. 
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Figure 2. Weekly Europe Brent Spot Price in US Dollar (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
2015) 
 
Even without detailed analysis, the graph illustrates the volatility of the oil price, espe-
cially in the last ten years. It furthermore shows how quickly the price can change. The 
recent development is of particular interest, as the price started to fall in the second 
half of 2014. But most of the forecasting about the finances of an independent Scot-
land was done earlier, calculating with then current, or even rising, oil prices. The Oil 
and Gas Analytical Bulletin from the Scottish Government (2013h) summarised 6 fore-
casts from different institutions that all projected the oil price to be above $100 per 
barrel at the beginning of 2015. While some may argue that the recent decline came 
as a surprise and was not to be expected, there is an established history of missed oil 
price forecasts (Hasantash, 2012). 
 
Of course, the actual tax income is not only affected by the oil price itself but also by 
production volume, investments and operating costs (Kemp, 2013) but the price is cer-
tainly a dominant factor here. An important point to make is that Scotland would be 
more exposed to this uncertainty than the UK currently is, given the relative size of the 
industry to the respective economies. So generally stated, Scotland would benefit more 
from high, but also suffer more from low oil prices, leading to greater swings in its 
economy and finances.  
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7 Critical Success Factor Analysis 
 
The overview of the case of Scottish independence and the discussion of relevant eco-
nomic aspects above have shown the complexity of this topic. Various parties with dif-
ferent political agendas, even including governments, research institutes and to some 
extent academics, focus on certain issues and stress the points that fit their objectives. 
This chapter builds on the discussion in previous sections, tries to defog politics and 
contribute to an informed debate by identifying and subsequently analysing the factors 
critical to the success of a newly independent Scotland.  
 
The so-called Critical Success Factor (CSF) Analysis has been used by businesses for 
decades. The concept originates from work done by Daniel in the 1960’s and became 
increasingly popular after Rochart refined the term “critical success factors” in 1979.  
Rochart (1979) defines CSF’s as a “the limited number of areas in which results… will 
ensure successful competitive performance for the organization”. Originally developed 
to help managers and executives focus their attention and channel resources to what is 
deemed most important, its open-ended design makes its application valuable in dvari-
ous ways (University of Washington, 2011). Logically, there are multiple approaches 
and foci, for example on certain types of CSF’s. Usually, the starting point is to identify 
the overall goals and objectives of an organization (University of Washington, 2011). 
 
For this particular scenario some general assumptions should be noted at the begin-
ning: In the following analysis, the focus will be on medium- to long-term success. It is 
assumed that the electorate voted Scotland to become independent in the nearby fu-
ture (one to two years from now, during which fair negotiations take place), that Scot-
tish governments will broadly follow suite with current overall policy ideals and that the 
global economy is reasonably free of drastic shocks. These assumptions are made in 
order to avoid having to debate very general CSF’s7. 
 
                                                
7 Without making these assumptions, one would arguable have to start from a more fundamen-
tal point and, for example, consider the continuing existence of the state and the democratic 
system as critical factors for economic success. 
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The first question to answer is what the objective in this case is. Besides the political 
demand of self-determination, there is the central claim that Scotland would be “better 
off” economically and financially as an independent country. So independent Scotland’s 
objective can be broadly identified as having sound state finances, a performing and 
growing economy, and a population which enjoys increased wealth and welfare, all 
relative to the RUK and prior performance8. The following factors that are critical for 
the achievement of this can be identified: 
• Currency Management 
• Oil and Gas 
• Population 
• Exploitation of new Opportunities 
 
The first factor, currency management, has been discussed extensively in this paper. It 
has been demonstrated that there is no one best currency option (see also Financial 
Times, 2014). Thus, it is even more important to, regardless of which currency is 
adopted, follow suite and establish a consistent, realistic policy framework focused on 
the strengths of the chosen option. Scotland’s success will depend on a range of ques-
tions following the decision, for example; to what extend will Scotland be able (in theo-
ry and practice) to exercise monetary policies tailored to Scottish needs and will Scot-
land be forced to adopt (rigorous) stabilizing and austerity practices?   
 
Another CSF is the revenue from North Sea offshore activities, namely from the oil and 
gas industry. As has been discussed, this sector is the major contributor to the econo-
my and state finances, and logically extremely important to the objective. As Scotland 
is a much smaller country than the UK, its economy would be less diversified, making 
Scotland’s economic fortune more dependent on fossil resources. With a booming oil 
industry Scotland could likely become a richer country and pass this on to its people. 
However, with declining oil income Scotland would find itself in a much more difficult 
position and would have to find other sources of income to outgrow the RUK. 
It should be noted that this CSF can hardly be controlled by Scotland. Of course, Scot-
land could, and might be well advised to, introduce more sector-friendly policies and 
understand itself more as an “oil state”. Nevertheless, the (global) oil price is the main 
determinant here, and Scotland is a relatively small player in the oil business in a glob-
                                                
8 Of course, the goals mentioned could be specified further. But the idea here is not to state 
that by doing one certain thing GDP would, for example, grow by half a percent. 
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al context. But an independent Scotland should, at least, consider carefully how to use 
the oil income and possibly try to find long-term investment strategies for it. This 
might mean to give up on some short-term promises. 
 
Population is listed as a CSF for multiple reasons. Firstly, the size of a country’s popula-
tion has a great impact on the growth of the economy (as shown in section 6.1). 
Moreover, Scotland faces the challenge of an aging population. This is a critical issue 
that definitely needs to be addressed if Scotland wants to outperform the RUK, in par-
ticular because it seems to be a greater issue for Scotland than it is for the RUK. 
  
Here immigration is a factor, too. Scotland will have to find suitable immigration poli-
cies in order to attract the needed skilled workers for its economy (and tax base). Ad-
ditionally, the whole subject of human capital is becoming more important. Education 
plays a crucial role in equipping the population, and hence the (future) workforce with 
a useful skillset. Scotland has always seen itself as a leader in higher education and 
keeping this role will be essential for success.  
 
Another CSF worth mentioning is the exploitation of new opportunities. The Scottish 
government has made it clear that it believes that Scotland does not benefit from cur-
rent UK policies and that under independence Scotland would have the opportunity to 
introduce policies tailored to Scottish businesses’ needs. One example often mentioned 
is the renewable energy industry, which has received more attention in Scotland than 
in other parts of the UK and certainly has a high potential (Carstairs, 2013). The key 
here is that Scotland would have to focus on these new opportunities and on creating 
even more innovation. This is particularly important to Scotland, as its economy is less 
diversified and will have to reinvent itself constantly to stay competitive. Scotland will 
have to make sure it takes advantage of its unique opportunities; otherwise it will 
quickly fall behind both the RUK and its own expectations. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this research was to identify and analyse the most essential factors for the 
economic success of Scotland in the case that it were to become an independent coun-
try. In order to do so, this thesis firstly outlined the set of constitutional arrangements 
feasible for Scotland. Already that discussion showed constitutional independence does 
not necessarily lead to full (economic) autonomy. The degree of autonomy would ra-
ther be determined by policy choices made after independence. One of the predomi-
nant factors identified is the choice of currency and subsequent monetary policy. While 
Scotland, in theory, could pick from various options (joining the euro, keeping the 
pound as part of a currency union or unilateral action, or creating its own currency), all 
of the options have constraints and would most likely limit the freedom of Scottish pol-
icy makers. The success of independence would also heavily depend on the fiscal 
framework implemented and Scotland’s overall finances. 
 
Another part of this research was devoted to the impact greater autonomy would have 
on economic growth from a microeconomic perspective. With independence, Scotland 
could introduce an agenda tailored to its own needs and would no longer have to share 
the same strategy with the entire UK. On the other hand, the economy of a small 
country is typically less diversified and more sensitive to shocks; Scotland’s economy 
and finances would heavily depend on the oil and gas industry. While this sector can 
be the source of large revenues, relying on its contribution to annual budgets comes at 
a risk, as the recent development of the oil price clearly shows. 
 
Albeit turned down by the electorate in September 2014, the scenario of independence 
remains fascinating. While most agree that independent Scotland would be in a sound 
position, the grand number of variables makes reasonable estimation close to impossi-
ble. This thesis identified, using the Critical Success Factor model, four aspects (cur-
rency management, oil and gas, population, and exploitation of new opportunities) that 
would largely determine the economic development and hence success of independent 
Scotland. Although no government has complete control over these factors, each of 
them will play a key role for Scotland. Consequently, addressing the issues and ques-
tions of these topics should be made a priority in any future attempt for independence. 
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This thesis produced a comprehensive analysis of the dominant economic topics of the 
Scottish independence debate. This generic approach did not, however, allow in-depth 
discussion of all the aspects. So, by nature, the focus was on the topics identified as 
predominant. Further research could thus be concentrated on other details of the de-
bate It could also be useful to analyse various concrete scenarios or to identify similari-
ties with independence discussions in other regions of the world. 
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